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On Being Obj ecti ve
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R. J. Connelly, Ph.D.
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lished book, Whitehead vs. Hart·
shore: Basic Metaphysical Issues,
Professor Connelly was Moody
Professor of Philosophy at Incar·
nate Word College where he presently teaches. He and his wife
were appointed Danforth Associates, effective 1979-85.

In a recent review of Heraclitean Fire: Sketches from a Life Before
Nature, Evelyn Fox Keller observes that the author, Erwin Chargaff, is
"a scientist with a different mission. He wishes to use his life as a levee
against the corruption of contemporary science, a corruption he
thinks is endemic to our times." 1 Chargaff may be mistaken about the
degree of corruption, but his own personal suffering within the scientific community serves to remind us that science is a human activity,
limited, and subject to human failing like everything else. But the dark
side of science seems to warrant more attention than is implied in the
familiar protest that those with dubious intentions are misusing or
abusing science. Perhaps we can better appreciate the multiple possibilities for corruption if we acknowledge that the total context in
which science is done is value-full, that science is not a privileged
value-free domain just because science claims objectivity, that value
judgments pervade scientific activity and therefore are fair game for
evaluation according to value standards and principles. This realization
seems to have emerged very slowly because the myth of objective
science has clouded our perception of the many value dimensions of
modern science. This paper will review briefly a few key dimensions in
order to place the myth in better perspective and encourage us to be
more objective about objectivity in science and the possibilities for
corruption in science.
The myth of value-free, objective science has gradually evolved during the last 250 years. Myth in this context can be defined as a unified
set of symbols that elicits an imaginative response involving recurring
patterns of belief, commitment, and action. Many people cite
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Descartes's body-soul dualism as the beginning of the myth. Descartes
turned the physical world into one vast complex machine divorced
from intrinsic soul principles which are only to be found in rational
human beings. The physical world therefore could be approached by
th e scientist, with the proper preparation and discipline of course, as
"object," not eliciting or responding to emotion, interest or subjective
bias. Ideally, values were irrelevant to the study of this mechanistic
world. Human beings were the exception considered in that respect
which was most human, most subjective and the source of values, the
rational soul. Whatever the origins of the myth, it is still with us
today, though shaken precisely because of value judgments by
counter-culture and anti-science movements, citizen and consumer
demand for greater accountability, congressional pressure to divert
funds from basic to applied research, and growing concern among
scientists like Chargaff who want to place limits on certain controversial areas of research .
First consider the myth in outline form. As French Nobel laureate
Jacques Monod articulates it:
Th e ad o ption of th e scientific m ethod , defining "true" knowledge as having
no possible source other than the objective confrontation of logic and
observation, eliminates ipso facto the animist assumption of the existence of
some kind of subjectivity in nature. The absolute objectivity of nature is the
b asic postulate of th e sci entific method . . .. 2

Freedom of inquiry then must be protected at all costs so that
scientists can be about their objective business of following welldefined rules to accumulate data, establish facts and test hypotheses.
Raising value issues and making value judgments are simply not the
concern of scientists functioning as scientists. Nor is it a scientific
concern that society may on occasion misuse or abuse the value-free,
value-neutral results of scientific inquiry. Science indeed can show us
how to achieve defined goals but not which goals to aim for. In sum,
science deals with obj ective facts not subjective values.
The purpose of this paper is not to aim one more attack at the
myth of objective science in hopes of destroying it once and for all.
Nietzsche, a would-be major myth killer in the 19th century, called
for the " death of God," meaning that the Christian myth and concept
of deity had outlived their usefulness and in fact were contributing to
the disintegration of European civilization. For much the same reasons
and in the same spirit, B. F. Skinner in Beyond Freedom and Dignity
more recently has called for the death of the Autonomous Man or the
myth of Individualism. It is certainly questionable whether the myth
of objective science has outlived its usefulness. At least some
demystifying is in order to temper misrepresentations of science that
stress its near-absolute objectivity and value-free character. Insufficient attention has been given in the past to questions more or less
appropriate to a philosophy of science. That is, what is the nature of
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the scientific method, its underlying assumptions, its limits, and what
is the significance of the total value context in which science operates?
The responsibility for pursuing such questions rests with professionals
in the sciences and the humanities as well. Science misunderstood in
our society today inevitably will be science misused. And we all suffer
the consequences, not just the Chargaffs.
We intend the following discussion to be suggestive only - a challenge to professionals in the sciences and the humanities to create
more cross-disciplinary opportunities for dialogue not only about
vaiues in science, but also the worth of greater value awareness in
science. The end result would be, perhaps, a healthier, more realistic
"myth" of objective science, one of greater benefit to society in the
long run.
The thesis of this paper is that scientists may and indeed should
aspire to even greater objectivity, but they and all of society should
not underestimate or ignore the significance of the ever-present, valueladen context in which science is done.
For purposes of this paper, we will describe "value" as anything
which can be conceptualized and prized, and both leads to action and
serves as a standard of action. Without delving into the metaphysics of
value, or various theories of ethics, or even deciding whether some
values may be constant or absolute rather than relative from culture to
culture, let us focus on the experienced fact that values are real in
mind and in human behavior. An intelligent creature capable of having
ideas is our starting point; experience reveals that certain ideas can
acquire a quality or character of being of significance, relevance,
importance, or desirability to the individual- in sum, prized. Such
ideas I designate as incipient values. They merit the title of lived values
when they become manifest in human behavior. Thinking about ideas
is certainly action of a sort. But values are more strictly themselves
when they serve as a springboard for overt externally manifest
behavior. Hypocrisy is the name for values which remain incipient and
are never translated into overt action. We are not always fully conscious of our values. But an analysis of our behavior or a process of
values clarification can reveal those lived values which constitute our
present value system. Every human being of course has such a system,
whether or not the values that comprise it are consistent with one
another. Coherent or not, the system may be broken down into
categories such as political, economic, legal, socio-cultural, esthetic,
and religious values. In any of these classifications, when a value
assumes relatively major status and has bearing on what it means to
lead the good life in some ultimate sense, we may designate such a
value as moral or ethical.
Moral and non-moral values are relational; that is, they signify that
an individual is establishing connections with the world around him.
Values exist primarily in our mind but have a vector quality. They give
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direction to human behavior which in turn shapes the world of the
individual according to how the individual thinks the world ought to
be, not just how it is in fact.
Because value decisions have to do with setting priorities for action,
and because without setting priorities (detemining to do this rather
than that) no action is really possible, value decisions, whether conscious or unconscious, are behind every instance of human activity.
This point of view encompasses both trivial and momentous actions
ranging from deciding whether to wear a tie or initiate all-out nuclear
war. Even so-called spontaneous or random activity may involve value
decisions. Painters in the action movement, for example, placed high
value on the intuitive-instinctive process of producing a piece of art,
rather than a more cerebral or rationally controlled process. "Spontaneity," of course, is just as much a value as "rational control." Value
decisions, then, are as inevitable and as commonplace as directed
human activity. If engaging in science is a directed human activity, it
inevitably involves such jUdgments.
The real issue, then, is not whether scientists can engage in value-free
activity or refrain from making value judgments in science, but
whether we can identify and clarify the more significant and, in particular, the ethical values which are actually involved in doing science in
our society today. We assume that increasing sensitivity to value issues
in science is a necessary condition for more responsible conduct of
science as well as more responsible attitudes on the part of society
toward science and its role in the world.
The Training of a Scientist
It is obvious that the scientist is not born or bred in an ivory tower,
but is very much the product of his times and his society. Educational
institutions, which provide the training ground for future scientists,
tend to reinforce the dominant values of society.
All students, for example, learn the basic lesson of competition
among individuals. Traditional approaches in higher education stress
the need to achieve mastery of subject matter in relation to other students and often at the expense of the others. After all, the
A-through-F grading system, to make any sense at all, requires some
failures if there is to be any contrast between succeeding and failing. If
everyone receives A, the grade is worthless. Those who are concerned
about national trends toward grade inflation perceive correctly, it
seems, that the inflation weakens the competitive system. There are
other signs, however, that a reaction is setting in and the system will
regain its previous "strength," such as it was.
Does competition affect or infect the way science is done? Consider
the following. From our own perspective it seems that for many scientists science has become just another job (true of other professionals,
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of course). A major objective, then, is staying on the job. For
example, we could cite the figures which show the job picture for new
physicists or whatever, is discouraging. The other side of that coin is
that "old" physicists will be even harder pressed to survive on the job.
Publish/produce or perish is a common enough refrain in higher education. Visible, publicly acknowledged results are all. In such an environment it seems inevitable that quantity of output will begin to dominate and quality and social relevance suffer. Yet journals proliferate to
accommodate increasing demand from institutions and individuals.
Ironically, possibly the most interesting scientific work is not published at all because it must be kept secret for industrial or national
security reasons. Journals do supply a forum for professionals to give
evidence of continuing productivity, unmindful that the number of
articles, like body counts in war, for example, may be a superficial and
simplistic measure of success - certainly teaching success. One cause
of superficiality is pressure to produce tangible results. This pressure
must have import on the choice of problems to be studied and
researched as well as the quality of effort that goes into the published
product.
Take the situation of an individual who is relatively insecure in his
research job with an institution. The insecurity may lead the individual to consent to do research, or, in the extreme case, to falsify experiments that he judges objectively ought not to be done. The justification for participating may be that survival is at stake: providing for
family, children's education, house payments, maintaining a certain
level of affluence. There are two kinds of competing value judgments
involved here. The researcher definitely affirms the importance of self
and family survival, but he also affirms, through his behavior (even
though there is a feeling of being compelled), the values and objectives
of that institution which demands the research.
Another alternative, of course, is to risk not surviving in whatever
sense, and support values respecting scientific research which are in
conflict with those of the institution. Non-survival in our society
usually means sacrificing what is commonly understood as quality of
life and rarely the fatal options of starvation, prison, or death which
faced Russian scientists in the past and apparently continue into the
present.
If an individual is relatively secure in his research job, competition
may take another form and move to a different level. Survival on the
job may be replaced by such values as achievement of power, prestige,
social privileges or intellectual superiority. These goals in turn dictate
that research will be chosen which promotes achievement of just these
goals.
And whether we are dealing with the average scientist or the superachiever, competition to produce results seems to penalize the
unorthodox, eccentric, maverick scientist. Perhaps Chargaff's life illus-
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trates this point. Part of the purpose of competition is to insure strict
conformity to prevailing scientific practice. The same value of staying
within accepted bounds is the rule in most institutions of higher learning as well. Again, this seems to affect the kind and quality of science
and education we have in society today.
The professionalization of knowledge tends to reinforce this conformism in science. Very early in his education the scientist learns that
being a professional means becoming specialized in a particular region
of thought. This is one way to make knowledge effective and research
thorough, but it has its dangers. As A. N. Whitehead put it over 50
years ago:
It produces minds in a groove. Each profession makes progress, but it is
progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions. The groove prevents straying across
country, and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further
attention is paid. But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate
for the comprehension of human life. Thus in the modern world, the celibacy of the medieval learned class has been replaced by a celibacy of the
intellect, which is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, or merely a
lawyer. People have lives outside their professions or their businesses. But
the point is the restraint of serious thought within a groove. The remainder
of life is treated superficially, with the imperfect categories of thought
derived from one profession. 3

Whitehead goes on to criticize traditional educational methods that
have grown up with the ideal of professionalism and still prevail today.
My own criticism of our traditional educational methods is that they are far
too much occupied with intellectual analysis, and with the acquirement of
formularized information. What I mean is, that we neglect to strengthen
habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in their full interplay
of emergent values, and that we merely emphasize abstract formulations
which ignore this aspect of the interplay of diverse values. 4

Overspecialization can lead to narrowing of vision concerning what
constitutes a scientific problem. It can also lead to analysis of problems isolated from their real life value-laden context. Not that values
can be eliminated from the analysis. Whitehead's point is that too
often too few values are considered by the specialist, and this tends to
distort the specialist's view of the way things really are.
Interestingly enough, there is a good practical reason for avoiding
overspecialization. In some fields there is a growing need to educate
scientists to career alternatives in light of the job market crunch.
Beverly J. Alexander, for example, cautions educators in chemistry:
We must discourage some of our students from specializing too much
because so many of today's problems are complex and cannot be solved by
specialists alone.
I think they are too important to leave entirely up to non-scientists. We
chemists have a valuable contribution to make in areas such as energy,
environment, conservation of natural resources, new materials, and food.
And I don't think our contribution should be solely at the laboratory stage. 5
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Whether for practical reasons or as a matter of principle, we may
agree with the need to encourage more of a balance between generalized and specialized education and with the importance of multi-disciplinary approaches for dealing with complex, multi-faceted problems
in contemporary society.
We should mention briefly two other areas of concern that seem to
be connected with the notions of competition and professionalism.
Besides competition within a profession, professions as institutions
have a tendency to be in competition with one another over the
limited economic resources of society. Many problems and issues are
involved here. Let us focus on just one. In the context of intra- and
inter-professional competition, scientists along with the rest of society
seem conditioned to accept without question the value that scientific
knowledge is private property and that an individual succeeds by
accumulating the most or the best or by selling it for profit. In our
society this is not an unusual development. We do have other models,
however, present and past. There was a time when scholarly work was
not signed, when plagiarism was not a problem, because scholars were
accustomed to duplicating the work of others without acknowledgement, adding to it and passing it on in the name of enriching the
intellectual heritage of mankind. 6 In our society, and perhaps rightly
so, we are definitely in the age of individual right to private property,
of copyrights and patents, and plagiarism as an evil. It still seems
important to raise the question: is scientific knowledge best understood
as a commodity, produced and owned by individuals, to be used for
bartering in the marketplace? The same basic question has been asked
about health care, for example: is it a right, a privilege, or a commodity that goes to the highest bidder? Is private property the best
model we have for understanding these issues? It goes without saying,
private property is a paramount value in our society. Scientists need to
ask, is it central to the development of scientific knowledge? Should it
be?
A second area of concern has to do with the type of person who
becomes a scientist. Like other professions in our society, competition
for membership results in a majority of scientists being white males
from middle-class backgrounds. Upon graduation they return to the
middle or upper-middle class. The relative exclusion of lower classes,
minorities and women from science professions suggests the need for
critical questioning. Does the under-representation of groups just mentioned deprive science of needed perspective that could make a difference in the kind of problems selected for study and research? Alfred
McClung Lee, in his presidential address to the American Sociological
Association in 1976, observed that sociologists "usually do not
transcend their own habitual intellectual orientations related to their
sex, social class, ethnic, racial, and other identities." 7 Background
undoubtedly colors scientific inquiry in the social and behavioral
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sciences. The amount and degree of coloring may be different, but we
suggest that the natural sciences are not exempt from the problem.
The question is, in what sense is science human? Howard Smith, from
the University of California at Berkeley, once stated, "The 'humanity'
of physics resides with my own humanity. Physics is human because I
am human and not because it has something 'to do with human
relations.' ,,8 We can agree with the concept, but then wonder to what
extent the values and background of the man carryover into his
physics .
Are scientists self-critical enough to be aware of the values at stake?
For instance, it is still both fashionable and economically and politically profitable to be a part of the war on cancer. In comparison,
there are only minor skirmishes against malnutrition or tropical diseases, for example, which plague a sizeable portion of the world's nonwhite population. Should we expect white male middle-class scientists
to have values any different from those of society's mainstream?
Perhaps not. But neither should we blindly accept the sort of arguments which claim the values of scientists as persons who have nothing
to do with dictating the direction of the science they do.
Dominant social values pervade the training and shaping of the
scientist. The value system of the scientist in the concrete necessarily
influences the science. This makes even more sense if we stop to think
that scientific knowledge does not have independent existence once
produced. Science primarily exists in a human mind thinking scientifically - the same mind that continuously makes value judgments. In
the real world it seems impossible to separate the person who is scientist from the science.
Technological Applications of Science
Similarly, it seems impossible to separate science from related technological applications. This is contrary to the usual reading of the
myth of objective science: the production of scientific knowledge is
one thing; the use or misuse of that knowledge is something altogether
different. The myth presents science as value-neutral and therefore
somehow beyond good and evil.
This aspect of the myth made more sense in pre-modern times.
John Dewey discusses the origin of what he calls the spectator theory
of knowledge. In the ancient Greek world, theorizing in general was
the prerogative of the privileged leisure class. Their meditation or
contemplation of the truth was not to be tarnished by association
with daily, routine practical matters. Such was the responsibility of
the lower classes. Knowledge, therefore, was strictly theory, a way of
"looking on" the world like a spectator, rather than a way of being
actively involved in the world. Thinking was not connected with
making or doing. Theory and practice were kept distinct.
November, 1981
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This dualism was plausible perhaps until Francis Bacon in the early
17th century urged science to aim at power over nature for the purpose of improving the material conditions of existence. Knowledge is
power to control and manipulate nature. As Bacon puts it, "Human
knowledge and human power meet in one." 9 Consequently, theory
and practice must be intrinsically connected. Today we have come to
realize, some would say with a vengeance, Bacon's ideal of taking full
advantage of the theory/practice connection.
The value of "knowledge for its own sake" may still inspire some
scientists. But it never was true, psychologically or any other way,
that the search for scientific knowledge only affected the researcher
and never other human beings or the environment. There is no such
thing as knowledge without effect in the world. The growing interconnection between the enterprises of science and technology merely
sharpens our perception of this fact. "Scientific knowledge for its
products or benefits" has all but replaced the ancient ideal of pure,
disinterested theory.
Can there be serious doubt that technology is wedded to science,
for better or worse? There is no branch of science in which discoveries
do not have some technological applicability. Every discovery invites
consideration of technological applications even to the point of
initiating new technologies. Hans Jonas shows very convincingly that
the relationship is causal, not just accidental.
First, much of science lives on the intellectual feedback fro m precisely its
technological applications.
Second , science rece ives from technology its assignments: in what direc·
tion to search, what problems to solve.
Third, for solving these problems, and generally for its own advance,
science uses advanced technology itself: its physical tools become ever more
demanding. In this sense, even purest science now has a stake in technology,
as technology has in science.
Fourth, the cost of those physical tools and of the staff to use them must
be underwritten from outside. The mere economics of the case calls in the
public purse or other sponsorship; and this funding of th e scientist's project
(even with "no strings attached"), is naturally given in the expecta tion of
some future retu rn in the practical sphere.
There is mutual understanding on this . The anticipated payoff is put
forward unashamedly as the recommending rationale in seeking grants or is
specified outright as the purpose in offering them.
In sum, science has its tasks incre asi ngly set by extraneous interests rather
than its own internal logic or the free curiousity of the invest igator . This is
not to disparage those extraneous interests nor the fact that scie nce has
become their servant, that is, part of the social enterprise.
But it is to say that the acceptance of this functional role (withou t which
there would be neither science of the advanced type we h ave nor the type of
society living by its fruits) has destroyed the alibi of pure, disinterested
theory. It has pu t science squarely in the realm of social act ion where every
agent is accountable for his or her deeds.lO
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Where scientific knowledge is power to be applied in the world, by
necessity moral value and moral responsibility come into play. The
greater the power the greater the responsibility. Scientists, because of
their vantage point on the inside of the process, perhaps more than the
general public, must accept responsibility for technological applications of their science.
Scientific Method Itself
Sandwiched between the topics of the "training of a scientist" and
the "technological applications of science" we find the meat of the
myth of objective science - the scientific method itself. There are
those who might admit at this point that value judgments are involved
in the decision to become a scientist in the first place, and later a
specialist; in the selection of problems or foci of interest for investigation; and in the technological applications of theory. But they still
might resist concluding that value jUdgments are intrinsic to the procedures of science, the scientific method itself. If extra-scientific value
judgments get mixed up in science, they say, this is more a commentary on the limitations of the scientist than the method since the
scientific method is only a tool which does not logically involve value
jUdgments.
A number of commentators in recent years have raised serious questions about the idea of a value-free method. Let me briefly summarize
a few main points.
T. S. Kuhn in his landmark work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 11 shows the significance of paradigms in normal scientific
activity. He describes paradigms as "universally recognized scientific
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions
to a community of practitioners." 12 In other words, normal scientific
activity is governed by some basic theory which is accepted as true
and has been applied to many of the problems in the field. The goal of
continuing scientific activity is the successful use of the established
theory to solve the remaining problems in the field.
Kuhn notes that normal, but not revolutionary, science tends to be
dogmatic. The typical scientist is not concerned with validating the
paradigm-theory: he merely accepts it, consciously or unconsciously,
and then spends his time articulating the paradigm and interpreting
new data according to it. Kuhn claims this dogmatism has many
advantages. He even thinks that the presence of a paradigm can aid in
the recognition of the need for revolutionary change to new
paradigms.
The main point for our purposes is that Kuhn shows very clearly
that adherence to a paradigm in science is a matter of sharing certain
values and standards, rules, assumptions, and points of view in a scienNovember, 1981
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tific community. In effect, a paradigm defines a certain value context
which includes the values of the paradigm and excludes other possible
values. The value context in turn guides the use of the scientific
method in relation to the paradigm.
Other commentators have focused on the traditional distinction
between theory and observation. N. R. Hanson, Paul Feyerbend,
Henry Margenau and others try to show that all observation is theoryladen, that we build our theories into our observation more than we
build our observations into our theories. This means it is not possible
to isolate a class of scientific statements which can be known directly
and from which the remainder can be inferred by some inductive
scheme. Observations as well as theories must be dependent on inferences. In other terms, reasoned judgments rather than so-called acts of
simple observation are the basis for determining the acceptability of
scientific data. What seems to be implied in this analysis of the theoryobservation relationship is that every theory constitutes a value or
value-system which functions as a standard for selecting data relevant
to that theory. This would be consistent with the above interpretation
of Kuhn.
Richard Rudner was one of the first philosophers of science to call
attention to the role of value judgments in the "acceptance" of scientific theories. His premise is that validating hypotheses is intrinsic to
the scientific method. That is, the scientist is in the business of deciding when a hypothesis is true enough. Since perfect verification is not
possible, the scientist must decide when the available evidence is
" 'sufficiently' strong or that the probability is 'sufficiently' high to
warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis." 13 "Strong enough,"
according to Rudner, involves a value judgment concerning the
importance of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. He asks, for example,
how high a degree of probability the Manhattan Project scientists demanded
for the hypothesis that no uncontrollable pervasive chain reaction would
occur before they proceeded with the first atomic bomb detonation or even
first activated the Chicago pile above a critical level. It would be equally
interesting and instructive to know how they decided that the chosen probability value (if one was chosen) was high enough rather than one that was
higher; on the other hand , it is conceivable that the probl em, in this form,
was not brought to consciousness at all. 14

The issue is whether a mistake would make any significant difference
according to our moral standards. "How sure we must be before we
accept a hypothesis depends on how serious a mistake would be."15
Rudner implies, I think, that we have entered a new era. Gathering
evidence is not simply a function of innocent observation. Active
intervention in nature or experimentation is critical to all of modern
science; animate nature is becoming more and more the subject of
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experimentation. A scientifically controlled atomic explosion may
serve the interests of some theory or other. But it inevitably affects
the whole atmosphere and therefore human life present and future.
The exploding field of biomedical research even more graphically
demands, not just occasions, experimentation on human subjects
present and future. But when the animate world itself becomes the
laboratory, experimentation and scientific method with it lose their
innocence, and moral issues command attention.
Rudner offers an excellent conclusion to this section and our paper
as a whole:
The traditional search for objectivity exemplifies science's pursuit of one
of its most precious ideals. For the scientist to close his eyes to the fact that
scientific method intrinsically requires the making of value decisions, and
for him to push out of his consciousness the fact that he does make them
can in no way bring him closer to the ideal of objectivity. To refuse to pay
attention to the value decisions that must be made, to make them intui·
tively, unconsciously, and haphazardly, is to leave an essential aspect of
scientific method scientifically out of control.
What seems necessary ... is nothing less than a radical reworking of the
ideal of scientific objectivity. The naive conception of the scientist as one
who is cold· blooded, emotionless, impersonal, and passive, mirroring the
world perfectly in the highly polished lenses of his steel·rimmed glasses is no
longer, if it ever was, adequate.
What is proposed here is that objectivity for science lies at least in becom·
ing precise about what value judgments are being made and might have been
made in a given inquiry - and, stated in the most challenging form, what
value decisions ought to be made. 16

As a final comment, we should re-emphasize the idea that the
"radical reworking of the ideal of scientific objectivity" be the responsibility of a cross-disciplinary effort involving both scientists and
humanists. Perhaps a concerted effort would provide better perspective on the issue of corruption in contemporary science. Then we can
see how much help Chargaff deserves at the levee.
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